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Many questions left unanswered in that class, and in torts literature
generally, like the reason for the "scope of employment" limitation on
master-servant liability, seemed to me easy ones from even a simplistic
economic perspective. Why, then, not look at torts law, indeed at all of
law, from that perspective and see what one might learn?
Guido Calabresi
The first impression I had on rereading Some Thoughts thirty or so years
after its publication, and thirty-five years after it was begun, is that much that
was novel then seems obvious today; the second (more self-serving) impression
is that it remains considerably more subtle in its appreciation of the limits of
economic analysis than much that followed it.
The article had its genesis in the fall of 1955, when I was a student in
Fleming James' Torts class. Many questions left unanswered in that class, and
in torts literature generally, like the reason for the "scope of employment"
limitation on master-servant liability, seemed to me easy ones from even a
simplistic economic perspective. Why, then, not look at torts law, indeed at all
of law, from that perspective and see what one might learn? Why not make that
perspective more subtle; why not go beyond the limits economists themselves
accepted, and see where that would lead?
The first full version of the article was submitted to The Yale Law Journal
as my draft "comment" in the competition for Law Journal Officers. Though
I was selected a "Note Editor," it was clear that my draft had disappointed the
outgoing board, which included people of unusual brilliance who today properly
dominate the profession. It was too complex and it didn't sound like law. This
cold reaction led to a happy result for me: instead of being published and
forgotten as an anonymous student comment, the manuscript was set aside to
reappear four years later, when I was a junior faculty member, as my first
article.
Perhaps there were new readers, or the times had changed. In any event,
the reaction was totally different. Ronald Coase's magisterial article, The
Problem of Social Cost, appeared some months later,108 as did Pietro
108. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). As Judge Richard Posner has
pointed outin his book, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 4 n.6 (1981), though Coase's article was properly dated
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Trimarchi's stunning book, RISCHIO E RESPONSABILITA OGGETrIVA, which was
published in Italy.101 Harry Kalven and Walter Blum attacked my article
brilliantly, but in precisely the way any author hopes to be criticized."1
Of course, many remained unaffected. At the Harvard Law School, it took
some ten years before the approach evoked significant response. While at the
Max Planck Institute in Hamburg, in 1965, my thesis was greeted icily by its
great Director, Professor Konrad Zweigert, who commented, "Very interesting,
very interesting, but of course you must realize it isn't legal scholarship." I
rather rudely retorted: "It soon will be." If anything, it was quickly to be too
much so!
I have one regret with respect to the article. An early version of it contained
a fairly full analysis of causal reciprocity which parallelled that which Coase
made so famous in The Problem of Social Cost. This draft was read by a distin-
guished economist who told me that I was quite wrong, citing, of course, Pigou.
Coase received the same reaction from Stigler and the whole of the University
of Chicago Economics establishment when he presented his manuscript at a
workshop there."' Like Coase, I was not convinced; indeed, I did not under-
stand the Pigovian reasoning. Unlike Coase, however, who stuck to his guns,
I was not sufficiently sure of myself (or of my economics) and so removed the
section. All that I left was a footnote, which, discussing the failure to charge
drivers for injuries to pedestrians, says:
In effect such a result would amount to a decision that automobile
accidents are more a true cost of walking and of living generally, than
of automobile driving. Actually they are probably a cost of both.
I have not, in this article, attempted to probe what influences our
decision that a particular "cost" is caused by one activity rather than
another. Clearly this is an important question. Indeed, it is the next step
in any thorough analysis of risk distribution. At this stage of analysis,
however, when we have not yet examined the need and the effect of
charging activities with those costs which all would agree they cause,
that step seems somewhat far removed.112
That "next step" was not, of course, "far removed." My unwillingness to
include a Calabresi version of Coase's theorem marked the last time I ever
omitted something I thought correct as a result of criticism that I did not
understand. In one sense, the matter is of no importance. Coase's analysis was
so much more compelling than mine, and he understood its significance so
1960, it did not appear in print until later because the Journal of Law and Economics was several issues
behind. This explains why neither he nor I cited the other.
109. P. IMMARCHI, Rlscmio E RESPONSiBILrrA OGGmrnVA (1961).
Ill. See Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970,
26 J.L. & EcoN. 163 (1983).
112. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,506 n.24
(1961).
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much more than I did (witness my failure in a subsequent article to grasp fully
the total force of Coase's theorem 13), that it would seem that all that was
involved was the question of whether one or two people had the same insight
at the same time; surely a trivial issue.
Unfortunately, however, that is not all there is to it. In The Problem of
Social Cost, Coase presented his insight, and transaction costs analysis, from
a distinctly anti-interventionistic, laissez-faire perspective. My ideological
framework in the late '50s and '60s was very different (though nowhere near
as skeptical of markets as Coase's had been twenty-five years earlier, when he
wrote The Nature of the Firm)."4 Accordingly, my version of Coase's theo-
rem-like my whole article-served to justify intervention in order to assign
costs in a way that reduced transaction costs. Had it been published, it would
have been impossible for many to reject "Coase's Theorem" as mere "right-
wing" ideology, since a "liberal" version would have been available at the
creation. Similarly, those who tried to make of economic analysis of law a basis
for blindly supporting the status quo would have found their path more difficult.
The fact of the matter is that Coase's insight, like all lasting contributions,
transcended the politics of its author. Coase, of course, knew and appreciated
this fully. Others, however, did not; some still don't. Had I not been frightened
by an erroneous criticism, this fact would have been patently obvious and the
Coase Theorem might well have had both a fuller and a more intelligent
acceptance than it did.
Thirty years later the fundamental import of Coase's theorem is clearly
recognized, and the point is of antiquarian interest only. It remains true, howev-
er, that advances in scholarship are richest when they occur independently to
several people whose work imparts differing nuances to the insight. Hence my
regret.
113. See, Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216
(1965) (which does not understand why Coase's theorem, on its terms, must apply to long-run as well as
to short-run cost allocations). The error was noted and corrected in Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968).
114. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNmICA (ns.) 386 (1937). In retrospect one can see that
The Nature of the Firm is based on an insight analogous to that in The Problem of Social Cost. In The
Nature of the Firm, the insight explains why "command" or "collective" arrangements are frequently used
in lieu of market ones; in The Problem of Social Cost, it explains how markets frequently modify and correct
errors made by "command" or "collective" arrangements. The insight is enormously important and
essentially the same; it is perhaps no accident, however, that in 1937 Professor Coase was a socialist, while
in 1960 he was a libertarian.
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